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SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM: THE 21ST CENTURY 
POISON PILL REPLACEMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Has the twenty-some year dominance of the poison pill come to an 
end? The 1980s saw the advent of the shareholders rights plan—more 
commonly referred to as the poison pill—due to the prevalence of corpo-
rate raiders wishing to make hostile bids for companies they wished to 
ultimately sell for parts. Initially praised as an effective tool for defend-
ing against hostile takeovers and protecting a company’s directors and 
officers, adoption of a poison pill often resulted in a temporary stock 
price increase to the adopting company because the pill sent a message to 
investors that the company might be a takeover target. Since the 1980s, 
the poison pill has evolved into a defensive tactic that runs the gamut of 
severity.  
Recently, however, shareholder activists have brought the poison 
pill into a new light by demanding that companies drop their sharehold-
ers rights plans, or by affecting change without owning a percentage of 
stock that would normally trigger a poison pill, calling into question the 
necessity of this hostile takeover defense. With the topics of corporate 
governance and shareholders’ rights on the upswing, shareholder activ-
ists and activist hedge funds are making a strong case for the shift from 
poison pills to actual shareholders’ rights and a seat at the governance 
table without the use of the offensive and dramatic takeover defense that 
is the poison pill. This Article argues that poison pills are becoming ir-
relevant because shareholder activists are able to drive essential business 
decisions as a hostile bidder would in a more peaceable, value-driven 
manner. 
Since the 1980s, public companies have been using poison pills to 
combat corporate raiders, hostile bidders, and now shareholder activists. 
While boards of directors initially praised the poison pill as an effective 
tool for leveling the playing field between a hostile bidder and a compa-
ny’s board of directors, it has now evolved into a mechanism that facili-
tates board entrenchment and subjective, board-centric decision-making.  
However, with a new trend in corporate governance and sharehold-
ers’ rights on the rise, the poison pill might meet its demise. Recently, 
shareholder activists have thrust the poison pill into the limelight to hold 
it accountable for what it really is, and not what it purports to be. All of 
the actions shareholder activists take with regards to public companies 
are those which a hostile bidder might wish to take if the bidder was suc-
cessful in a bid for a company and not impeded by a poison pill, demon-
strating how shareholder activists are contributing to the declining use 
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and irrelevancy of the poison pill. In fact, poison pills are becoming ir-
relevant in this day and age because shareholder activists are able to 
drive essential business decisions as a hostile bidder would in a more 
peaceable, value-driven manner. 
In order to show how poison pills are becoming irrelevant due to 
shareholder activists, Part II of this Article begins by examining the poi-
son pill and its development over time, comparing the historical purpose 
of the poison pill to its current use in public companies, including a dis-
cussion regarding shareholders’ current opposition to the poison pill be-
cause of its effect on shareholders rights, and its questionable lawfulness 
and ethical nature. Part III of this Article then turns to shareholder activ-
ists, focusing on activist hedge funds, and discusses their roles in public 
companies, including their roles in increasing shareholder value and roles 
in key decision-making of a company, and shareholder activists’ effica-
cy, including their long-term positive effects on target companies and the 
increasing frequency with which companies are faced with shareholder 
activists, further demonstrating their efficacy. Part IV concludes with a 
discussion of the irrelevance of the poison pill due to shareholder activ-
ism and its effects.  
II. THE POISON PILL AND ITS DEVELOPMENT OVER TIME 
Justifications for the creation of the poison pill differ greatly from 
justifications for its continued use today, and the tactic is now a much 
less prevalent defensive takeover measure in public companies, demon-
strated by examining the poison pill and its development over time. In 
this section, Subsection II(a) discusses the purpose behind the poison 
pill’s invention and the issues the defensive measure was designed to 
protect against. Subsection II(b) discusses the current use of the poison 
pill, including shareholders’ increasing opposition to the defensive 
measure and the questionable lawfulness of the measure in light of the 
Williams Act.  
a. The Historic Purpose of the Poison Pill 
Martin Lipton, of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, invented the 
poison pill in the early 1980s to protect against corporate raiders, and in 
order to prevent the break-up of a company.1 The poison pill had the 
effect of eliminating, or at least severely hindering, a hostile bidder’s 
involvement in important business decisions commonly reserved for the 
company’s officers and board of directors. Lipton described the poison 
pill as giving a “board of directors the opportunity to level the playing 
field” at a time when corporate raiders and hostile takeovers were on the 
  
 1. See The Deal, Why Martin Lipton invented the poison pill, VIMEO (Dec. 23, 2010, 12:49 
PM), https://vimeo.com/18125037. 
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rise, and targeted companies were routinely bought and sold for their 
parts.2  
Delaware courts quickly reviewed the legality of the poison pill and 
deemed the defensive measure an acceptable defense to a hostile takeo-
ver bid, so long as the board of directors’ decisions and actions satisfy 
enhanced judicial scrutiny. Since the 1980s, the use of poison pills has 
become commonplace in public companies,3 although the reason behind 
a company’s adoption of a poison pill seems to have changed.  
b. Current Use of the Poison Pill 
More than thirty years after its invention, the poison pill is most of-
ten used today for entrenchment of a company’s board of directors and 
officers, and is on the decline because of its severity and questionable 
ethical nature. In fact, many companies that adopt poison pills do so be-
cause of a recent decrease in their stock price,4 suggesting that these 
companies do not wish to invite any acquisition activity so that boards of 
directors are not threatened, even if the company’s stock price reflects 
that the company might be underperforming and in need of a new direc-
tion that might be provided by a hostile bidder.  
Further demonstrating the use of a poison pill for board entrench-
ment is the decreasing share percentage that triggers a company’s poison 
pill. In the 1980s, a twenty percent trigger was the rule; today, companies 
are setting triggers as low as fifteen or ten percent.5 Moreover, Delaware 
courts recently upheld a poison pill with two different triggers that allow 
more stock ownership for passive investors, while maintaining a lower 
threshold for activist shareholders.6  
Not only has use of the poison pill declined because of its severity, 
but its use is also abandoned because of its questionable ethical nature. 
At its inception, the poison pill was a tool for the board of directors to 
  
 2. See id. 
 3. See Kris Frieswick, Poison Pill Popping, CFO (Oct. 15, 2001), available at 
http://ww2.cfo.com/banking-capital-markets/2001/10/poison-pill-popping/. (“John P. Biestman, vice 
president of finance at Commerce One . . . [explains] ‘at this point, poison pills are really just an 
established practice.’”) 
 4. See id.  
 5. See id. (“When companies first started adopting pills in the early 1980s, a 20 percent 
trigger was the rule, says McGurn. Today, triggers are more often set at 15 percent, and 10 percent is 
increasingly common.”); See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Don’t Make Poison Pills More Deadly, N.Y. 
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 7, 2013) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Don’t Make Poison Pills More Deadly], 
available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/dont-make-poison-pills-more-deadly/. (“In-
deed, among the 637 companies with poison pills in the FactSet Systems database, 80 percent have 
plans with a threshold of 15 percent or less. No other developed economy grants corporate insiders 
the freedom to cap the ownership of blockholders they disfavor as such low levels.”). 
 6. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Poison Pill’s Relevance in the Age of Shareholder Activ-
ism, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Apr. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Solomon, Poison Pill’s Relevance], avail-
able at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/04/18/poison-pills-relevance-in-the-age-of-shareholder-
activism/?_r=0NYT. (“The pill sets two limits for ownership—a 20 percent limit for passive inves-
tors like mutual funds and a 10 percent threshold for activist shareholders.”) 
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level the playing field, but now the balance of power has tipped dramati-
cally in management’s favor.7 Before poison pills, if management did not 
adequately maximize shareholder value, the price of the company’s stock 
declined; this then allowed a hostile bidder to buy into the company at a 
low price and replace management, which created an incentive for man-
agement to maximize shareholder value to avoid being replaced. The 
poison pill eliminates this incentive because it allows management to 
refuse any hostile bidder, even if management is shirking its fiduciary 
duty to the shareholders. The threat of a hostile takeover means nothing 
in the face of a poison pill, and the once effective check on a company’s 
management no longer exists.8 This practice is clearly entrenchment of 
the board of directors, which would not survive enhanced judicial scruti-
ny in court,9 but public companies are aware that many hostile bidders do 
not wish to spend time and money arguing over a poison pill in court, so 
they are not incentivized to challenge this practice. Not only does it elim-
inate an incentive to maximize shareholder wealth, but the poison pill 
also operates to disenfranchise shareholders by refusing them the option 
to participate in a hostile tender offer, evaluate the bidder for themselves, 
and vote in the hostile bidder’s proxy contest, all of which are conse-
quences which violate enhanced judicial scrutiny as it relates to hostile 
takeover defenses.10   
So what is a hostile bidder to do when faced with a poison pill? 
There are seemingly only three ways around a poison pill: negotiate a 
friendly transaction with the target company, prove the pill fails en-
hanced judicial scrutiny in court, or start a proxy contest to remove the 
target company’s board of directors.11 While negotiating a friendly trans-
action with the target company seems like the best option, a target com-
pany that is open to friendly negotiation is most likely open to a merger 
or acquisition, is willing to talk to any acquirer outside of using defen-
sive tactics, and will redeem the rights in a poison pill before a hostile 
  
 7. See Julian Velasco, The Enduring Illegitimacy of the Poison Pill, 27 J. CORP. L. 381, 382–
84 (2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=825046. (“And, while in 
place, [the poison pill] is an absolute barrier to the consummation of a hostile takeover. The only 
way to counter a poison pill is to have it removed, which is easier said than done. From manage-
ment's perspective, the poison pill is almost too good to be true. . . . [T]he poison pill is extremely 
potent, capable of preventing all hostile takeovers, regardless of their underlying merit.”) 
 8. See Bebchuk, Don’t Make Poison Pills More Deadly, supra (“Over time, however—and 
without sufficient attention by investors and public officials—companies have started to use poison 
pills to prevent acquisitions of stakes that fall substantially short of a controlling block.”) 
 9. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (“A Delaware 
corporation may deal selectively with its stockholders, provided the directors have not acted out of a 
sole or primary purpose to entrench themselves in office.”) 
 10. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 660 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“Action de-
signed principally to interfere with the effectiveness of a vote inevitably involves a conflict between 
the board and a shareholder majority. Judicial review of such action involves determination of the 
legal and equitable obligations of an agent towards his principal. This is not, in my opinion, a ques-
tion that a court may leave to the agent finally to decide so long as he does so honestly and compe-
tently; that is, it may not be left to the agent’s business judgment.”) 
 11. See Velasco, supra at 383. 
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bidder triggers the defensive tactic if they want the deal to go forward. 
The other two options—legal battles or a proxy contest—are quite costly 
to a hostile bidder, who could easily find another target company without 
such a defensive tactic in place. Target companies know that the mone-
tary cost and uphill battle of combating a poison pill are huge deterrents 
to any attempts to defeat the tactic, and use this fact to their advantage to 
keep themselves in power, prevent hostile bids, and disenfranchise 
shareholders.12 It seems highly unethical that a public company can hide 
behind its wealth relative to a hostile bidder, and its perceived better 
judgment, in order to keep its management in power and thwart any po-
tential merger or acquisition by using a defensive tactic whose purpose 
has changed so much since its invention.  
These trends in poison pill use demonstrate a motivation that stems 
from a board of directors unwilling to relinquish their seats of power, and 
the Delaware courts approval of such practice further demonstrates how 
use of a poison pill has shifted from allowing for a level playing field to 
allowing a board of directors to protect themselves from any and all hos-
tile bids that threaten their power. Boards of directors are no longer in 
need of a level playing field, rather those wishing to acquire or merge 
with a company are now at a disadvantage. 
All of these trends in poison pill use are contributing to its own de-
mise, and this can be seen through shareholders’ increasing interest in 
corporate governance and recent questions regarding the poison pill’s 
lawfulness in light of the Williams Act.  
i. Shareholders’ Increasing Interest in Corporate Governance 
Shareholders increasingly oppose use of a poison pill because of its 
effect on shareholder choice and because it limits shareholders’ decision-
making ability. As certain poison pills have become more toxic or con-
tentious, shareholders have begun to take note of the effects of the poison 
pill and have begun to demand change from corporations using this de-
fensive tactic. This opposition has manifested itself in shareholders’ in-
creasing interest in corporate governance in recent years,13 which has 
invariably led shareholders to become more interested in what sorts of 
  
 12. See Velasco, supra at 383. (“A second way around the poison pill is to persuade the courts 
that the target company’s board of directors is breaching its fiduciary duties by refusing to redeem 
the poison pill Rights. . . . However, courts are not easily persuaded. . . . Despite the obvious benefits 
to shareholders, who would prefer to sell their shares at an often substantial premium to market 
price, courts are hesitant to second-guess the business judgment of directors. . . . The third way 
around the poison pill is to launch a proxy contest . . . A proxy contest, however, is expensive and 
time-consuming. Thus, only the most determined bidders can proceed with this option, and yet, this 
is the only real option available to most hostile bidders.”) 
 13. See James R. Copland, 2015 Proxy Season Wrap-Up, Proxy Monitor (2015), available at 
http://www.proxymonitor.org/forms/2015Finding4.aspx (finding that corporate governance—which 
includes separate chairman and CEO, proxy access, special meetings/written consent, and voting 
rules—was the subject of 42% of shareholder proposals in 2015, a close second only to social policy 
shareholder proposals at 43%.) 
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decision-making power they are allowed in a company, and more specif-
ically, which decisions they are barred from making for themselves.  
A poison pill prevents shareholders from reaping the benefits of a 
tender offer, usually offered at a premium over market value, without 
allowing shareholders the ability to make the decision to accept or deny 
the offer themselves. Also, a poison pill prohibits shareholders from ap-
proving a change in control—in the form of a hostile bidder—that would 
lead to different, sometimes more profitable, business decisions than 
those currently undertaken by the board of directors. As such, sharehold-
ers are increasingly weary of this defensive tactic and its adoption in a 
company. 
In 2001, more than 2,200 corporations had poison pills in effect; 
just ten years later, corporations with poison pills in effect totaled less 
than half of the 2001 amount,14 representing the first time in two decades 
that this number has fallen below 1,000.15 Moreover, do not expect this 
number to increase anytime soon. While corporations have been allowing 
their poison pills to expire or are eliminating them because of pressure 
from informed shareholders, Institutional Shareholder Services has re-
leased proxy guidelines that, if followed, point towards a further decrease 
in poison pill use.16 These guidelines urge shareholders to vote against or 
withhold a vote for any directors who previously adopted a poison pill of 
duration of more than twelve months, renewed a poison pill without 
shareholder approval, or made a material adverse change to an existing 
poison pill without shareholder approval.17  
  
 14. See Andrew L. Bab & Sean P. Neenan, Poison Pills in 2011, CONFERENCE BOARD: 
DIRECTOR NOTES (Mar. 2011), available at https://www.conference-
board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=TCB%20DN-V3N5-11.pdf&type=subsite (“A January 4, 2011 
search through CapitalIQ found that fewer than 900 corporations had poison pills in effect. . . .  
Moreover, fewer pills are being adopted in the absence of a specific threat. . . .”) 
 15. See John Laide, A New Era in Poison Pills – Specific Purpose Poison Pills, 
SHARKREPELLENT.NET: RESEARCH SPOTLIGHT (Apr. 1, 2010), available at 
https://www.sharkrepellent.net/request?an=dt.getPage&st=1&pg=/pub/rs_20100401.html&Specific_
Purpose_Poison_Pills&rnd=42401  (“On 3/30/2010, Callon Petroleum Corp’s poison pill expired 
without renewal. As a result, the number of U.S. companies with a poison pill in force fell to 999, 
the first time the total was less than 1,000 since about 1990. There were no regulatory or legal 
changes leading to the decline in companies adopting and maintaining routine poison pills but can 
largely be attributed to the increased efforts of shareholder activists along with an enhanced aware-
ness of corporate governance issues by U.S. corporations . . . .”) 
 16. See Bab et al., supra (“In addition, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) revised its 
guidance for the 2010 proxy season in a manner likely to continue the downward trend in the num-
ber of poison pills. In the past ISS has recommended that shareholders vote against or withhold their 
votes for directors who voted to adopt or renew a poison pill of any duration without shareholder 
approval (or without commitment to put the pill up for shareholder approval within 12 months of 
adoption or renewal).”) 
 17. Id. (“Prior to this revision, ISS would have made a voting recommendation only in the 
year that the pill was implemented or renewed. Under the revised guidelines, a director’s voting 
record on the company’s poison pill may factor into ISS’s recommendation concerning that director 
every time he or she is up for election.”) 
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While the use of poison pills is declining, the types of poison pills 
that are adopted are increasingly shareholder-friendly. Corporations are 
weary of the fact that shareholders now understand how poison pills di-
minish their decision-making ability, causing corporations to adopt poi-
son pills that require shareholder approval or are of duration of five years 
or less.18 All of these trends in poison pill construction and adoption stem 
from shareholder opposition to the defensive tactic and subsequent inter-
est in corporate governance, and demonstrate the tactic’s declining 
prevalence in public companies. 
ii. Lawfulness of the Poison Pill in Light of the Williams Act 
Not only has the poison pill declined due to shareholder opposition 
and increased shareholder interest in corporate governance, but also the 
lawfulness of the poison pill is questionable given its draconian nature 
and possible preemption by the Williams Act. However, even though the 
practice is questioned, no one wants to be the first to overturn the over-
whelming case law in favor of poison pills. Also, the legal nightmare that 
a hostile bidder would have to endure to challenge the legality of a poi-
son pill is a strong deterrent, causing opponents of the poison pill to find 
ways around the tactic (for example, shareholder activism) that lead to its 
irrelevance and declining use.  
Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Robert Jackson Jr. argue that alt-
hough federal courts have largely ignored the possibility of preemption 
of state antitakeover laws authorizing the use of poison pills, the Wil-
liams Act preempts these state laws.19 The Williams Act creates a federal 
standard for regulating unsolicited tender offers, and when it was enact-
ed, states responded by developing state laws that created more barriers 
to unsolicited tender offers. During the 1970s and 1980s, federal courts, 
including the Supreme Court, held that the Williams Act preempted 
some of these state laws. Since that time, federal courts have largely ig-
nored other state laws that have implications for unsolicited tender of-
fers. In particular, Professors Bebchuk and Jackson argue that the Wil-
liams Act likely preempts state laws authorizing the use of poison pills 
because such laws are the “most powerful impediment to outside buyers 
of shares”, and are more powerful impediments than those created by the 
laws that courts held preempted in the 1970s and 1980s.20 Professors 
  
 18. See Laide, supra (finding that “routine poison pill adoptions are declining, while ‘in play’ 
adoptions and poison pills adopted to protect [net operating loss carryforwards] are on the rise.”) 
 19. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Toward a Constitutional Review of the 
Poison Pill, 144 COLUM. L. REV. 1549 (Oct. 2014) [hereinafter Bebchuk et al., Towards a Constitu-
tional Review], available at http://columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Bebchuk-
Jackson.pdf (“We argue that the state-law rules governing poison pills are vulnerable to challenges 
based on preemption by the Williams Act. Such challenges, we show, could well have a major 
impact on the corporate-law landscape.”) 
 20. See Bebchuk et al., Towards a Constitutional Review, supra at 1575–78 (“Given that the 
state-law rules on the poison pill have transformed the tender-offer landscape imagined by the draft-
ers of the Williams Act, have provided incumbents with stronger antitakeover protections than those 
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Bebchuk and Jackson argue that many of the state laws on which compa-
nies rely to support their use of this defensive tactic would be invalidated 
if challenged,21 and as such, the poison pills created under these laws 
would be illegal.  
When early versions of Professors Bebchuk and Jackson’s study 
began circulating, Martin Lipton—creator of the poison pill, himself—
came to the poison pill’s defense. Calling Bebchuk and Jackson’s posi-
tion “tendentious and misleading”,22 the vehement debate among these 
individuals highlights the polarizing effect the poison pill has on differ-
ent constituencies.  
Furthermore, corporations’ poison pills are challenged in courts 
quite frequently nowadays and although some judges rule in a way that 
skirts the issue at hand or find the defensive tactics troubling, the over-
whelming body of law in favor of poison pill use prevails, and no one 
wants to be the first person to rule otherwise.  
In a recent challenge to a corporation’s poison pill, Third Point LLC 
and Daniel S. Loeb challenged Sotheby’s poison pill, which set two lim-
its for ownership based on the type of investor.23 Delaware’s Chancery 
Court upheld the poison pill without actually ruling on the validity of the 
poison pill, because even without the court’s intervention, there was a 
high probability that Third Point would win its proxy contest to replace 
three of Sotheby’s directors.24 The court’s ruling implied that even with-
out striking down the poison pill—a holding that would dramatically 
change Delaware law as it relates to poison pills—Third Point would 
achieve the same result as if the court had struck down Sotheby’s poison 
  
imposed by the statutes considered by the Supreme Court in MITE and CTS, and are not meaningful-
ly different from the laws considered in those cases, an examination of the constitutional validity of 
these rules is necessary. Courts, commentators, and practitioners should not take for granted that 
state-law poison-pill rules would survive a preemption challenge.”)  
 21. See Bebchuk et al., Towards a Constitutional Review, supra at 1549. 
 22. See Martin Lipton, A Response to Bebchuk and Jackson’s Toward a Constitutional Re-
view of the Poison Pill, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
FINANCIAL REGULATION (Mar. 13, 2014), available at http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/03/13/a-
response-to-bebchuk-and-jacksons-toward-a-constitutional-review-of-the-poison-pill/ (“Bebchuk 
and Jackson’s paper is tendentious and misleading . . . [and] thus conveys a fanciful vision of Wil-
liams Act preemption standards . . . .”)  
 23. See Solomon, Poison Pill’s Relevance, supra (“Sotheby’s has become a hedge fund hotel 
as a number of funds, including Eton Park and Marcato Capital Management, have taken stakes in 
the company. Leading the charge is Third Point, which has taken a 9.62 percent stake in the auction 
house and is running a proxy contest to replace three of Sotheby’s directors, comparing Sotheby’s to 
‘an old master painting in desperate need of restoration.’ Sotheby’s has based its defense on an 
increasingly common tactic: a low-threshold poison pill.”)  
 24. See Michael J. De la Merced & Alexandra Stevenson, Sotheby’s Poison Pill Is Upheld by 
Delaware Court, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 2, 2014), available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/02/sothebys-poison-pill-is-upheld-by-court/?_r=0 (“Vice 
Chancellor Parsons noted that the hedge fund manager had roughly 10 times the number of shares 
that Sotheby’s board now owns, and, even now, Third Point has a roughly 50-50 chance of winning 
the proxy contest . . . . ‘There is a substantial possibility,’ the vice chancellor wrote, ‘that Third Point 
will win the proxy contest, which would make any preliminary intervention by this court unneces-
sary.’”) 
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pill, so the judge did not need to rule in a way that would make him re-
sponsible for a substantive change in Delaware corporate law. Similarly, 
in a 2011 suit between a hostile bidder Air Products and Chemicals and 
target Airgas, the Delaware Chancery Court upheld Airgas poison pill, 
stating that the proper solution for the shareholders’ problem with the 
poison pill was a new board of directors.25 Even in light of the Chancel-
lor’s personal reservations regarding the law of hostile takeover defen-
sive measures, Chancellor Chandler was forced to release an opinion 
consistent with binding Delaware precedent, although Chancellor Chan-
dler personally took issue with the defensive tactic as it was used in this 
case.26 However, even with the support of Professors Bebchuk and Jack-
son’s research and cases in which it is obvious that judges are beginning 
to realize the poison pill’s time has come and gone, challenges to the 
constitutionality of state laws authorizing the use of poison pills have not 
been made, even though such a challenge would seemingly put poison 
pills to bed for good. Since no one wants to be the first mover, opponents 
of the poison pill have had to find new ways to successfully affect 
change in corporations, and in doing so, have become so effective that 
poison pills are becoming irrelevant.  
It is plain to see that the historic need for the poison pill and its in-
vention no longer exist in the market today. Poison pills have gone from 
leveling the playing field for a company’s board of directors and man-
agement to allowing boards of directors to entrench themselves in office 
to the detriment of shareholders. This defensive tactic continues to create 
a hostile environment for all those affected by it, and the increased 
shareholder opposition to such a tactic and the debated lawfulness of the 
poison pill have led to its declining use.  
However, another phenomenon has played a large role in the poison 
pill’s declining use because it has made the defensive tactic somewhat 
irrelevant—shareholder activism. Because shareholder activists are able 
to accomplish the same goals that hostile bidders wish to achieve, in a 
  
 25. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Air Products Bid Dies as Airgas Poison Pill Lives On, 
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Solomon, Air Products Bid], available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/02/15/air-products-withdraws-airgas-bid-after-ruling/ (“Chancel-
lor Chandler also held that while it was not ‘realistically attainable’ for Air Products to call a special 
meeting to remove directors, the prospect of another election meeting in September was so attaina-
ble. The poison pill was not preventing the Air Products bid from ultimately succeeding since Air 
Products could attempt to elect more directors then.”) 
 26. Id. (“‘Although I have a hard time believing that inadequate price alone (according to the 
target’s board) in the context of a non-discriminatory, all-cash, all-shares, fully financed offer poses 
any ‘threat’—particularly given the wealth of information available to Airga’s stockholders at this 
point in time—under existing Delaware law, it apparently does’ . . . .  Chancellor Chandler was also 
quick to note that ‘[in] my personal view, Airgas’s poison pill has served its legitimate purpose [and] 
has given Airgas more time than any litigated poison pill in Delaware history’ . . . . However, again, 
he could not substitute his judgment for binding Delaware precedent . . . . For takeover law general-
ly, Chancellor Chandler’s opinion goes on a tour de force detailing 30 years of Delaware case law on 
the poison pill. In the end, the chancellor does assert that ‘this case does not endorse ‘just say nev-
er’’—raising the prospect that in the case of a conflicted board, a pill could be ordered redeemed.”) 
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more peaceable, value-driven manner, poison pills are declining even 
further in use. 
III. SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISTS 
Shareholder activists are outsiders who affect major business deci-
sions that increase shareholder value, without threatening a total break-
up of a company or creating a hostile environment. Through their ac-
tions, shareholder activists, and more specifically hedge fund activists, 
have had the same effect on corporations that hostile bidders or corporate 
raiders of the past wished to achieve. Accordingly, shareholder activists 
are eliminating the need for the poison pill, because they are able to af-
fect change without triggering a pill’s harsh consequences.  
Section III(a) discusses shareholder activists’ role in public compa-
nies, including their ability to increase shareholder value and play an 
active role in key decision-making. Section III(b) discusses the studies 
performed to date showing shareholder activists’ efficacy and evidence 
showing that shareholder activism is on the rise in the United States.  
a. Shareholder Activists’ Role in Public Companies 
Shareholder activists function as outsiders who affect major busi-
ness decisions and bring objectivity to directors and officers. In the past, 
it was generally accepted that individual shareholders owned too few 
shares in order to effectively monitor management or a board of direc-
tors’ performance, and these individual shareholders did not possess the 
financial wherewithal to undertake effective monitoring processes.27 As 
such, shareholders were relegated to the position of a 1950s child at a 
dinner table: seen but not heard.  
This is no longer the case with the advent of shareholder activists, 
who make it their business to inform themselves and monitor a compa-
ny’s officers, directors, and operating performance. In particular, hedge 
fund activists have drastically changed the relationship between a com-
pany’s officers and directors and its shareholders. Hedge fund activists 
are investment firms that identify corporations that can make operational 
changes, improvements, or undertake strategic business plans that create 
increased value for the company, and consequently, the company’s 
  
 27. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: 
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 864–85 
(2013), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/23491833?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents (“The 
canonical account of U.S. corporate governance, which stresses the tension between dispersed 
shareholders and company managers in large public firms, has become factually obsolete and now 
provides a misleading framework for contemporary corporate governance theorizing. In this account, 
framed eighty years ago by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, shareholders individually own too few 
shares to monitor management’s performance and confront coordination costs that make collective 
monitoring difficult . . . the Berle-Means premise of dispersed share ownership is now wrong. In 
2011, for example, institutional investors owned over 70% of the outstanding stock of the thousand 
largest U.S. public corporations.”) 
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shareholders.28 By attracting investors and capital, these hedge funds are 
able to function as intermediaries who “monitor company performance 
and present to companies and institutional shareholders concrete pro-
posals for business strategy through mechanisms less drastic than takeo-
vers.”29 Activist hedge funds have the financial wherewithal to effective-
ly and objectively monitor a variety of corporations, and to engage in the 
necessary research and planning to craft business strategies to be pre-
sented to a company’s board of directors, and do so through the use of 
proprietary programs.30 Activist hedge funds often partner with a group 
of current and former chief executive officers of large, Fortune 500 com-
panies, and use this vast array of experience and expertise to enter a cor-
poration’s boardroom in a peaceful, mutually agreeable manner.31  
The discussions and environment created by activist hedge funds 
are entirely different from those which are created by hostile bidders (or 
were created by corporate raiders in the past); activist hedge funds focus 
on demonstrating ways in which both a corporation and its shareholders 
can improve—a pareto improvement—while hostile bidders often put a 
board of directors on defense, and create an us versus them environment.  
Through their cooperative discussions with corporations, activist 
hedge funds accomplish a variety of different business transactions. 
These business transactions include, but are not limited to, divesting as-
sets, changing investment or payout levels, altering capital structure, 
replacing the CEO, cost reductions, reorganizations, corporate spin-offs, 
revamped financing structures, and more shareholder-oriented uses of 
cash and liquidity.32 Furthermore, while both hostile bidders and hedge 
fund activists are interested in steering the future direction of a company, 
  
 28. See Hudson Executive Capital, About Us, HUDSON EXECUTIVE CAPITAL (2015), available 
at http://www.hudsonexecutive.com/about (“Our historical relationships and deep insight allow our 
team to work effectively with corporate boards, management teams and shareholders. Accordingly, 
we are well positioned to employ our principle of Constructive Engagement: Discussions with the 
board, management and shareholders of our portfolio companies will be anchored in fundamental 
and strategic analysis, collaborative dialogue and mutual respect.”) 
 29. See Gilson et al., supra at 867. 
 30. See PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Shareholder Activism: Who, what, when, & how? 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 2015), available at https://www.pwc.com/us/en/corporate-
governance/publications/assets/pwc-shareholder-activism-full-report.pdf. (“Although each hedge 
fund activist’s process for identifying targets is proprietary, most share certain broad similarities.”) 
 31. See Hudson Executive Capital, supra (“The Firm’s 14 CEO Partners . . . and an additional 
CEO Network of 20+ LPs invested in the Fund, bring a wealth of managerial, operational and regu-
latory expertise to the Firm. The CEO Partners have served with distinction on 66 public company 
management teams and boards across the Firm’s key industry verticals. The Firm’s Founders draw 
on 50 plus combined years of executive, valuation and transactional experience, and the insights of 
the Firm’s CEO Partners, who bring approximately 200 years of CEO experience in industry verti-
cals representing more than 80% of the S&P500.”) 
 32. See Lucian Bebchuk, Alan Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund 
Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1093 (2015) [hereinafter Bebchuk et al., Long-Term Effects of 
Hedge Fund Activism], available at http://columbialawreview.org/the-long-term-effects-of-hedge-
fund-activism/; see also Global Markets Intelligence, Sector Disruptors: Investor Activism, S&P 
Capital IQ, at 2 (Jul. 2, 2015), available at http://www.spcapitaliq.com/documents/our-
thinking/research/sector-disruptor-investor-activism.pdf.  
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hedge fund activists differ in that they do not wish to eliminate share-
holders or the company itself; “the company’s future independence or 
survival is not the primary question,”33 the company’s future business 
decisions are hedge fund activists’ main focus.  
Further evidence of shareholder activists’ beneficial role in public 
companies is demonstrated by the following discussion of shareholder 
activists’ role in creating shareholder value and their role in major deci-
sion-making in public companies. 
i. Role in Shareholder Value 
Shareholder activism aims to create shareholder value by affecting 
major business decisions of a company that boards of directors may be 
opposed to, without creating a hostile bidder versus directors environ-
ment. Preliminarily, hedge fund activists are required to publically dis-
close the purchase of a significant stake of a corporation’s stock through 
a Schedule 13D filing.34 This not only puts a corporation on notice that a 
shareholder activist is likely to engage with management, but also sends 
a positive message to the public: “public disclosures of the purchase of a 
significant stake by an activist are accompanied by significant positive 
stock-price reactions as well as followed by subsequent improvements in 
operating performance” which are not reversed in the long run, according 
to a recent study regarding the long-term effects of hedge fund activ-
ism.35 Furthermore, this initial rise in stock price is not followed by a 
corresponding decline down the line; in fact, the stock price of such 
companies generally continues to rise.36 Simply by announcing their in-
volvement with a corporation, hedge fund activists create shareholder 
value through increases in the corporation’s stock price. This increase 
does not even account for the increased value to shareholders that hedge 
fund activists create through their role in decision-making, which will be 
discussed in greater detail in Section III(b).  
  
 33. See Solomon, Poison Pill’s Relevance, supra (“There is one clear difference—activism is 
about enhancing shareholder value, while in a hostile takeover the claim was that shareholders were 
being taken advantage of.”) 
 34. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Schedule 13D, U.S. SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION: FAST ANSWERS (Dec. 5, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/sched13.htm. 
 35. Bebchuk et al., Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, supra at 1089 (testing “the 
claim that interventions by activist hedge funds have a detrimental effect on the long-term interests 
of companies and their shareholders” and finding “that the claim is not supported by the data.”) 
 36. See George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Investor 
Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97, 118 (2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1557356 (“But even the basic claim that hedge 
funds are quick in-and-out investors has been disproved. Moreover, studies of corporate performance 
show that investors are right about large blockholders. Companies with large outside shareholders 
tend to perform better and have less waste than other companies. And when one or more investors 
acquire a large block of a company’s stock, the company’s stock price does not decline after its 
initial rise but tends to keep growing.”) 
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This is not to say that hostile bidders are unable to contribute to in-
creased shareholder value; however, the value created by hedge fund 
activists is much different from that created by a hostile bidder. Hostile 
bidders offer shareholder value in a tender offer in the form of a premi-
um over market value, however, the negative effects of a poison pill of-
ten offset this value. Companies facing a hostile bidder automatically go 
into defensive mode, and if a company’s poison pill is triggered, the hos-
tile bidder is placed in isolation and unable to act. Also, hostile bidders 
are often accused of targeting companies solely for their own benefit; 
yes, shareholders benefit in the short-term from an accepted tender offer, 
but then they no longer form part of the company and the resulting posi-
tive results achieved are only beneficial to the hostile bidder.  
This is not the case with activist hedge funds, which create share-
holder value for themselves as shareholders, but also the rest of the 
shareholders involved in a corporation. A variety of studies have been 
performed to calculate the shareholder value created by hedge fund activ-
ists; Brav et al. find a 21% average annualized market adjusted return,37 
while Klein and Zur report a 22% average shareholder market-adjusted 
return over the year after the shareholder activist initiates action.38 Fur-
thermore, these returns do not disappear once the hedge fund activists 
divest their shares in a corporation. On average, three years after a hedge 
fund activist’s exit from a company, shareholder returns are positive.39  
Not only do activist hedge funds propagate the common saying 
“there’s no ‘I’ in ‘team’” through their creation of shareholder value, 
they also do so in a peaceable manner, unlike hostile bidders. The aver-
age activist block of shares in any one corporation is 8%, a number 
smaller than would trigger a common poison pill.40 Furthermore, while 
activist hedge funds keep their ownership of the company at a non-
threatening level, they also tend to divest their shares of a corporation if 
  
 37. See Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy, & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, 
Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1729 (2008), available at 
http://www.columbia.edu/~wj2006/HFActivism.pdf (finding that “activist hedge funds in the United 
States propose strategic, operational, and financial remedies and attain success or partial success in 
two-thirds of cases . . . . Target firms experience increases in payout, operating performance, and 
higher CEO turnover after activism” through a study of data collected from 11,602 Schedule 13D 
filings from 2001 to 2006.”) 
 38. See April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and 
Other Private Investors, 64 J. FIN. 187, 188, 226 (2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=913362 (studying a sample of 151 hedge fund 
activist campaigns conducted between 2003 and 2005).  
 39. See Bebchuk et al., Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, supra at 1134 (“Using 
each of the three standard methods for detecting abnormal returns . . . we have found no evidence for 
the pump-and-dump view. Following the month of partial cashing out by the activists, there is no 
evidence for negative abnormal returns in the subsequent three years. Indeed, returns in this period 
are positive, though not always statistically significant, in many specifications.”)  
 40. Gilson et al., supra at 899. 
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discussions and negotiations with management are unsuccessful, rather 
than turning towards a proxy contest as hostile bidders often do.41  
In fact, activist hedge funds approach the process of engaging with 
companies much differently than hostile bidders generally do. There ex-
ist four stages of hedge fund activist action: public filing of a Schedule 
13D, demand and negotiation, proxy threat, and finally, proxy contest.42 
Of note is the fact that hedge fund activists move to each subsequent 
stage of activist action with declining frequency.43 This is further evi-
dence of the fact that hedge fund activists are concerned with achieving 
their goals in the least-hostile manner possible, and avoid entering into a 
proxy contest—or even threatening a proxy contest—as much as possi-
ble. As such, hedge fund activists are able to focus their time and re-
sources on creating value in corporations most willing to accept their 
expertise, and in ways that create a positive relationship and environment 
between the hedge fund and the corporation, all in order to create con-
crete, measureable shareholder value. 
ii. Role in Major Decision-Making 
Shareholder activists not only create shareholder value in a peacea-
ble manner, but are also causing companies to become more objective in 
their business decisions, to consider all business opportunities fully and 
fairly, and shifting focus from officer and director entrenchment towards 
shareholders. By objectively evaluating companies through their proprie-
tary programs and providing business strategies that could unleash unre-
alized company value, hedge fund activists are contributing towards cre-
ating more objective, fair companies.  
With hedge fund activism on the rise in the United States, many dif-
ferent firms and multiple publications are creating guidelines to aid com-
panies in becoming less vulnerable to shareholder activists. Interestingly 
enough, these guidelines do not emphasize the adoption of defensive 
tactics, or the refusal to communicate with shareholder activists—in fact, 
most of these guidelines advise against these tactics. Rather, a strong 
emphasis is placed on simply doing the business of the company well.  
For example, PricewaterhouseCoopers released a publication de-
scribing shareholder activism and how corporations can respond to this 
  
 41. Gilson et al., supra at 900–01 (“After public posting of a bond (the toehold investment) to 
establish its credibility and secure the chance of its return, the activist undertakes a nonpublic cam-
paign to elicit a favorable institutional response. Subsequent actions reveal the outcomes of such 
efforts. With approbation, the activist proceeds; without, it withdraws, realizing that the chances for 
success are low.”) 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. (“Of particular interest is the declining frequency of each stage and the increasing 
success rate at the later stages . . . . Presumably this is because the activist evaluates the likelihood of 
success at each stage in deciding whether to continue, and the target makes the same assessment at 
each stage as it seeks out information about institutional sympathy for the activist’s proposals.”) 
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growing trend. Among its suggestions for corporations wishing to pre-
pare for shareholder activists, PricewaterhouseCoopers recommended, 
“critically evaluatin[ing] all business lines and market regions . . .  evalu-
at[ing] the [company’s] risk factors . . . develop[ing] an engagement plan 
that is tailored to the company’s shareholders and the issues that the 
company faces.”44 Similarly, a report released by JPMorgan Chase & Co. 
advocates for focusing on stock performance, preparing to engage inves-
tors and knowing one’s investors, evaluating potential business challeng-
es and risk factors, and avoiding hostile defensive tactics.45 Other steps 
companies are advised to consider include demonstrating a commitment 
to best practices in corporate governance, engaging with the company’s 
investor base, and being the first to prepare a “white paper” on the com-
pany.46 Put simply, public companies are advised to beat shareholder 
activists to the punch—consider business decisions and opportunities 
fully and objectively to maximize company value, and pay attention to 
shareholders before shareholder activists do. 
Not only are companies being advised to simply be better in order 
to deal with shareholder activism, but companies that are performing 
poorly or are stuck in a subjective frame of mind are being singled-out as 
shareholder activist targets. Barry Genkin and Keith Gottfried, partners 
specializing in mergers and acquisitions and defending against share-
holder activism at the law firm of Blank Rome LLP, outline the most 
common ways companies are left vulnerable to shareholder activists with 
a focus on the board of directors’ actions and composition.47 Among the 
ten ways outlined by Genkin and Gottfried, “insufficient level of industry 
experience, absence of core or necessary competencies among board 
members, insufficient level of board independence, excessive board 
compensation, no separation of the chairman and CEO roles, low turno-
ver among board members, failure to heed the will of shareholders, rec-
ord of supporting or facilitating its own entrenchment, and failure to hold 
management accountable”48 all point towards solutions that lead to more 
objective, shareholder-centric companies. Genkin and Gottfried are high-
  
 44. See PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, supra at 8–9.  
 45. See Corporate Finance Advisory, The Activist Revolution: Understanding and navigating 





 46. See Barry H. Genkin & Keith E. Gottfried, Ten Steps to Prepare a Company for the New 
Age of Shareholder Activism & Prevent it From Being a Sitting Duck This Proxy Season, WALL 
STREET LAWYER (Apr. 2008), available at 
https://www.blankrome.com/index.cfm?contentID=37&itemID=1529.  
 47. See Keith E. Gottfried & Barry H. Genkin, 10 Ways That a Company is Made Unduly 
Vulnerable to an Activist Shareholder Due to its Board’s Composition, Governance, Leadership and 
Compensation, WALL STREET LAWYER (Jan. 2010) [hereinafter Gottfried et al., 10 Ways], available 
at 
https://www.blankrome.com/siteFiles/Publications/862E055AB64F47156478F6DFDA9B1AAF.pdf. 
 48. See id. 
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lighting characteristics common to boards of directors of many public 
companies that, if ameliorated, would help protect against shareholder 
activism, but would also have the effect of creating more independent, 
objective management teams that respond to their shareholders. In es-
sence, the advice given to protect against shareholder activism accom-
plishes the same goals that shareholder activists wish to achieve when 
they enter into a company—create independent management and boards 
of directors that are responsive and accountable to their shareholders.  
Shareholder activists, and hedge fund activists in particular, are not 
only increasing shareholder value for the companies in which they in-
vest, but they are also contributing towards creating a market full of 
more objective, shareholder-focused corporations.  
b. Shareholder Activists’ Efficacy 
While shareholder activists are creating shareholder value and fos-
tering a market full of more objective, shareholder-centric companies, it 
is also important to note that shareholder activists have long-term posi-
tive effects on the companies with which they interact, as discussed in 
further detail below. Similarly, shareholder activism is on the rise, point-
ing to the practice’s efficacy, also discussed further below. 
i. Positive Effects on Targeted Companies 
The most common argument against shareholder activists is that 
they advocate for “actions that are profitable in the short term but are 
detrimental to the long-term interest of companies and their long-term 
shareholders.”49 The creator of the poison pill himself, Martin Lipton, 
comments, “[the poison pill] is particularly critical in the face of in-
creased activism in which some hedge funds use aggressive tactics to 
expropriate short-term benefits at the expense of long-term value-
maximizing investments made by corporations on behalf of all share-
holders.”50 However, these comments are not supported by studies exam-
  
 49. See Bebchuk et al., Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, supra at 1087 (“We focus 
on the ‘myopic-activists’ claim that has been playing a central role in debates over shareholder 
activism and the legal rules and policies shaping it. According to this claim . . . activist shareholders 
with short investment horizons, especially activist hedge funds, push for actions that are profitable in 
the short term but are detrimental to the long-term interests of companies and their long-term share-
holders. The problem, it is claimed, results from the failure of short-term performance figures and 
short-term stock prices to reflect the long-term costs of actions sought by activists. As a result, 
activists with a short investment horizon have an incentive to seek actions that would increase short-
term prices at the expense of long-term performance, such as excessively reducing long-term in-
vestments or the funds available for such investments.”) 
 50. See Liz Hoffman, Martin Lipton: Poison Pills are Critical in the Face of Increased Activ-
ism, WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT (Jan. 29, 2014), available at 
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/01/29/martin-lipton-poison-pills-are-critical-in-the-face-of-
increased-activism/ (“Mr. Lipton has been one of the most vocal critics of shareholder activism, 
which he has said focuses on short-term profit at the expense of long-term investment and can leave 
companies on shaky footing. Wachtell Lipton often advises companies seeking to keep these inves-
tors at bay.”) 
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ining the long-term effects of hedge fund activism. In fact, studies show 
shareholder activists play a positive role in a company’s history and are 
good for business. 
The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism studies 2,000 ac-
tions by activist hedge funds from 1994 to 2007, through the use of 
Schedule 13D filings.51 First, it is established that hedge fund activists 
generally target underperforming companies, whether such underperfor-
mance is relative to its peers or a company’s own historic levels.52 Sec-
ond, through the use of various statistical significance tests, it is found 
that there is no evidence supporting opponents of shareholder activists’ 
concerns that activist action leads to short-term gains that ignore the 
long-term negative effects to a company’s operating performance. In 
fact, “in each of the years three, four, and five following the [activist 
action], we find improvements that are statistically significant.”53 This 
study goes to show that not only are hedge fund activists saying they will 
increase shareholder value and company value, they are actually follow-
ing through on their word, and the market is taking note: “large block-
holders do not reduce, but increase, firm investment,”54 meaning that 
even investors are convinced of shareholder activists’ positive effect. In 
addition, companies with activist hedge fund investors tend to exhibit 
better performance and are less wasteful than other companies.55  
So who is to say that these increases in company value and stock 
price are due to hedge fund activists and not some other cause? First, it 
would seem a quite interesting coincidence that all of these statistically 
significant trends in increased stock price and better operating perfor-
  
 51. See Bebchuk et al., Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, supra at 1090. 
 52. See Bebchuk et al., Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, supra at 1117 (“To begin, 
activists do no generally target well-performing companies. Targets of activism tended to be compa-
nies whose operating performance was below industry peers and also their own historical levels at 
the time of intervention. Moreover, at the time of the intervention, the targets seemed to be in a 
negative trend with operating performance declining during the three years preceding the interven-
tion. Furthermore, during the five years following the intervention, we find no evidence supporting 
concerns that activist interventions are followed by short-term gains that come at the expense of 
subsequent long-term declines in operating performance.”) 
 53. Id. (“Examining both Q and ROA, and conducting comparisons both to the end of the year 
following the intervention and the end of the year preceding it, the feared adverse effect on long-
term performance is not found in the data. Indeed, in each of the years three, four, and five following 
the intervention, we find improvements that are statistically significant. Thus, overall, the evidence 
on firm performance does not support the myopic-activists claim.”) 
 54. See Dent, supra at 117 (“The most striking evidence is the many studies finding that the 
existence or acquisition of large block stock holdings in a company by institutional investors does 
not cause the company’s stock price to fall but rather to rise, and the increase is greater if the share-
holder is expected to be aggressive. One study finds that performance-based CEO pay works best 
when a large blockholder monitors CEO performance. Another finds that large blockholders do not 
reduce, but increase, firm investment.”) 
 55. See Dent, supra at 118 (“Moreover, studies of corporate performance show that investors 
are right about large blockholders. Companies with large outside shareholders tend to perform better 
and have less waste than other companies. And when one or more investors acquire a large block of 
a company’s stock, the company’s stock price does not decline after its initial rise but tends to keep 
growing.”) 
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mance that begin at the time of the activist action are due to something 
other than the initial activist action. Second, activist action amounts to 
significant costs: research, development of business strategies, engage-
ment of experts, overhead costs of maintaining the firm, etc. In fact, it 
has been estimated that, on average, a campaign that results in a proxy 
contest costs nearly $11 million.56 No one is interested in undertaking 
significant costs if they believe that the improvements they are aiming to 
achieve would result in any event without intervention.57 This goes two-
fold for a hedge fund, whose business is wise investment. As such, it 
seems quite likely that the expertise and money hedge fund activists put 
into activist action contribute towards these long-term increases in stock 
price and operating performance.  
ii. Shareholder Activism on the Rise 
Shareholder activism is on the rise in the United States. First of all, 
one need only look at the trend in Schedule 13D filings to see how dra-
matically shareholder activism and activist hedge funds are growing; in 
1994, only ten 13D filings were filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, while in 2007, that number increased to 272.58 Moreover, 
from 2005 to 2009, eighty-nine activist actions occurred; from 2010 to 
2014, 341 activist actions occurred, and this trend is only continuing in a 
stronger manner in 2015.59 Within the activist hedge fund world, total 
  
 56. Gilson et al., supra at 898 (“Gantchev’s recent work sheds light on the costs of hedge fund 
activism and its returns. A campaign that culminates in a proxy contest costs nearly $11 million on 
average, he estimates. When costs are taken into account, nominal hedge fund returns are on average 
cut by approximately two-thirds. These benefit-cost considerations become important when consid-
ering the regulatory framework within which activism operates.”) 
 57. See Bebchuk et al., Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, supra at 1119–20 (“Final-
ly, critics of hedge fund activism might argue that the identified association between activist inter-
ventions and subsequent improvements in operating performance does not by itself demonstrate a 
causal link. It could merely reflect the activists’ tendency to choose targets whose operating perfor-
mance is expected to increase in any event. Under such a scenario, the improvement in long-term 
performance experienced by targets reflects activists’ ‘stock picking’ ability rather than the activists’ 
impact on the company’s operating performance . . . . However, there are at least three reasons to 
believe that the identified improvements in operating performance are at least partly due to the 
activist interventions. First, activist engagements involve significant costs, and activist investors 
would have strong incentives to avoid bearing them if they believed that the improvements in per-
formance would ensue in any event, even without engaging with target companies . . . . Second, 
improvements in operating performance follow activist interventions not just in our dataset as a 
whole but also in the subset of activist interventions that employ adversarial tactics . . . . [Third], the 
view that the interventions contribute to subsequent improvements is consistent with the finding in 
earlier work co-authored by two of us (together with Hyunseob Kim) that such improvements do not 
take place after outside blockholders pursuing a passive strategy announce the purchase of a block of 
shares, but do occur when blockholders switch from passive to activist stance.”) 
 58. See Bebchuk et al., Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, supra at 1100.  
 59. See Global Markets Intelligence, supra at 1–2 (“We have reached the golden age of inves-
tor activism. In the past five full years, activist engagements increased fourfold. Furthermore 64 
activist cases have been announced thus far in 2015 (through June 19, 2015) compared with only 18 
total transactions in all of 2005 and 102 for 2014, according to S&P Capital IQ data . . . . Applying 
S&P Capital IQ’s data and analytics, we identified just fewer than 500 examples of investor activism 
involving companies with individual market capitalizations of $1 billion or more from the beginning 
of 2005 to mid-2015: From 2005 to 2009, 89 activist actions occurred. In the past five years, from 
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assets under management now exceed $100 billion,60 reaching $112.1 
billion in the third quarter of 2014,61 and $115.5 billion in November of 
2014.62 In 2014 alone, assets under management by hedge fund activists 
increased by 24% from the beginning of the year until November.63 
Not only have activist actions and assets under management in-
creased dramatically in recent years, but the number of activist hedge 
funds themselves have increased. From 2003 through May 2014, 275 
new activist hedge funds were launched.64 Furthermore, larger compa-
nies used to be somewhat immune to shareholder activists and their cam-
paigns, but this is no longer true. From 2013 to 2014, the number of ac-
tivist actions in companies with a market capitalization greater than $25 
billion increased from only six to seventeen.65 41% of current activist 
hedge funds focus on North America,66 and 29% of directors surveyed in 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 2014 Annual Corporate Directors Survey say 
their board had interactions with activist shareholders and engaged in 
extensive discussions about activism in the last twelve months. Another 
14% respond that they have discussed shareholder activism in the board-
room, even though they have not yet had any interaction with an activ-
ist.67 
If these numbers are not convincing enough proof that shareholder 
activism is on the rise and such an increase is due to its efficacy, then one 
need only examine the careers of those starting activist hedge funds for 
more proof of this fact. High-level management executives, partners at 
high-ranking law firms, and many more high-ranking officers and direc-
tors in corporate America are leaving these positions in order to start 
activist hedge funds. Not only are these individuals leaving their high-
paying, well-regarded positions to start these investment firms, but for-
mer CEOs and chairmen of boards of directors of major U.S. companies 
are partnering with these hedge funds to influence their investment strat-
egy.68 If not because of the efficacy of hedge fund activism and its prov-
en track record of increasing shareholder value and creating better per-
forming companies, why leave a familiar, comfortable position in corpo-
  
2010 to 2014, 341 actions took place. We have seen volume increases for every year since 2010, and 
this trend has continued strongly in 2015.”) 
 60. See PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, supra at 2. 
 61. See Corporate Finance Advisory, supra. 
 62. See PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, supra at 6. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, supra at 2. 
 65. See Corporate Finance Advisory, supra (“While shareholder activist themes have re-
mained largely the same, the companies targeted by shareholder activists have changed. In particu-
lar, the relative immunity that size and scale have historically offered from shareholder activism no 
longer exists . . . . the number of large- and mega-cap companies (greater than $25 billion market 
cap) targeted by shareholder activists has almost tripled in 2014 relative to recent years.”) 
 66. See PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, supra at 3. 
 67. See PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, supra at 5. 
 68. See Hudson Executive Capital, Our Team, HUDSON EXECUTIVE CAPITAL (2015), availa-
ble at http://www.hudsonexecutive.com/our-team. 
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rate America for these sorts of investment firms? Surely, these individu-
als have not all fallen victim to the same ruse, they must also agree that 
shareholder activism is on the rise because of its efficacy and proven 
success. 
All of the foregoing suggests shareholder activism as an alternative 
to a hostile bidder and defensive takeover measures. The stated benefits 
of this form of activism are not purely speculative, but in fact, these ac-
tivists have been demonstrated to increase long-term shareholder value, 
long-term operating performance, and are becoming popular modes of 
investment due to their efficacy. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The past necessity for the poison pill has significantly diminished, 
and companies who employ poison pills often do so for entrenchment 
purposes. Furthermore, shareholder activism has led to a decrease in the 
use of poison pills, and while hostile bidders aim to affect major business 
decisions of a company, and shareholder activists aim to do the same, the 
resulting effects of these two groups’ actions have differing consequenc-
es that both lead to the declining use of the poison pill. Hostile bidders 
have increasingly brought the poison pill to light through lawsuits, rous-
ing shareholder opposition to such a defensive tactic and questioning the 
ethical nature and legality of such a defensive tactic. On the other hand, 
shareholder activists are able to effectively accomplish the goals of hos-
tile bidders without creating a hostile, defensive environment within a 
company, and without triggering a poison pill. Moreover, shareholder 
activists create long-term value that can be distributed to the company 
and all shareholders alike. All of this taken together, poison pills are be-
coming increasingly irrelevant and declining in use in this day and age 
because shareholder activists are able to drive essential business deci-
sions as a hostile bidder would in a more peaceable, value-driven man-
ner. 
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